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Directorate  
of Intelligence

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Intelligence Memorandum  
Office of East Asian Analysis  
5 January 1993

## North Korea Watch, 1 - 31 December

### Summary

Talks on implementing the North-South reconciliation accord remained suspended during December, and P'yongyang boycotted the ninth round of prime-ministerial meetings to protest Seoul's plan to hold the US-South Korean Team Spirit military exercise in the spring. Although the Joint Nuclear Control Commission met twice, P'yongyang used the sessions to pressure Seoul on Team Spirit rather than to negotiate terms for bilateral inspections. The IAEA moved ahead with efforts to gain access to two undeclared nuclear waste sites the North has tried to conceal at Yongbyon.

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This memorandum was prepared by the Offices of East Asian Analysis, Imagery Analysis, and Scientific and Weapons Research, in the Directorate of Intelligence.

Information available as of  
5 January 1993 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome.

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# Contents

Status of Negotiations on the Reconciliation Accord . . . . .	3
Status of Negotiations on the Denuclearization Accord . . . . .	3
Assessing P'yongyang's Propaganda Line . . . . .	4
IAEA Developments . . . . .	5

Looking Ahead: A North Korean Calendar . . . . .	12
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### Status of Negotiations on the Reconciliation Accord

Negotiations to implement the reconciliation accord stayed on hold in December. There was no attempt to reschedule the initial meetings of the Joint Reconciliation, Military, Economic, and Sociocultural Commissions that P'yongyang boycotted in November to protest Seoul's plan to resume the US-South Korean military exercise Team Spirit in 1993. Moreover, in a 19 December radiobroadcast, P'yongyang refused to attend the ninth round of Prime Ministers' talks--slated for 21-24 December--citing Seoul's failure to cancel Team Spirit as the cause. The North had earlier rebuffed proposals by the South to discuss arrangements for the high-level meeting. [ ]

### Status of Negotiations on the Denuclearization Accord

In December, discussion of a bilateral inspection regime remained at a standstill while delegates to nuclear talks argued over the Team Spirit military exercise. P'yongyang used the meetings to insist Seoul cancel Team Spirit, but the South said this would be possible only after the two sides agreed on an inspection regime and conducted initial inspections. [ ]

### The Joint Nuclear Control Commission

*Twelfth JNCC Meeting, 10 December.* The two sides did not discuss an inspection regime [ ] but raised other issues:

- The **North**, in addition to calling on Seoul to cancel Team Spirit by 15 December, demanded the right to inspect all "US nuclear sites" on the Peninsula "unconditionally"--presumably not as part of a bilateral inspection regime. In a new demand, the North's delegates insisted Seoul disclose details of the South's alleged nuclear weapons development program.
- The **South** offered to help the North improve relations with other states if there were progress on the nuclear issue. P'yongyang's delegates responded that North Korea did not need improved relations with any country and would not be pressed into concessions on a bilateral inspection regime. [ ]

*Working Group, 14 December* [ ] the North spent most of the meeting demanding Team Spirit's cancellation. Even so, the delegates [ ] did discuss two articles of the North's draft inspection regime [ ]

*Thirteenth JNCC Meeting, 17 December.* [ ] there was no progress in this meeting:

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- The North's chairman said the Team Spirit exercise had caused the cancellation of the upcoming prime-ministerial talks. The South contended Pyongyang was violating the reconciliation accord by breaking off the dialogue over Team Spirit, because the agreement allows each side to conduct military exercises.
- The South's delegates repeated the Team Spirit issue would be resolved if the two sides conducted effective nuclear inspections.
- The North again charged Seoul was developing nuclear weapons and restated its opposition to the South's call for reciprocal and challenge inspections of military and civilian sites. [ ]

The meeting ended without agreement on the date or level of the next JNCC contact. The North proposed holding a plenary session later in the month, but the South wanted a working-level meeting. [ ] South Korean officials assumed the North would use a full JNCC meeting only for propaganda on Team Spirit, and they wanted the two sides to make progress on an inspection regime at the working level before scheduling another plenary meeting. [ ]

#### Assessing P'yongyang's Propaganda Line

In December, P'yongyang used the media to try to portray the North as a cooperative member of the world community:

- North Korean media reaffirmed the regime's willingness to open its nuclear facilities to international scrutiny. A radio report of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting stressed the North had already allowed four "unscheduled" IAEA inspections. It also cited the chief North Korean delegate's pledge that P'yongyang "will faithfully fulfill" its obligations under the nuclear safeguards agreement "in the future as well."
- Unusually favorable media coverage of the UN operation in Somalia suggested P'yongyang wanted to be in step with other nations on an issue of broad international concern. Noting that the Security Council had undertaken to "guarantee the supply of relief goods" to Somalia, P'yongyang radio acknowledged, without elaboration, that "some 1,800 US marines" were among the first contingents of "the UN multinational forces" dispatched to Somalia. In the past, P'yongyang has invariably criticized operations involving US military personnel. [ ]

The North's sensitivity about its image was also evident in coverage of Russian President Yel'tsin's visit to Seoul. P'yongyang media reacted defensively to Yel'tsin's remarks that Moscow will consider "abrogation or revision" of the 1961 USSR-North Korean treaty. On 10 December the Korean Central News Agency reported a Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement that "everyone knows" the 30-year-old treaty is "not suited to the

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realities of today." The spokesman asserted P'yongyang had previously requested modification of the treaty. He also reportedly claimed North Korea's defense is "based strictly on the principle of self-reliance" and that P'yongyang had never received "free military aid from the Russian Federation." [REDACTED]

### IAEA Developments

At the Board of Governors meeting during 3-4 December, P'yongyang avoided a high-profile confrontation over the IAEA's request for access to two undeclared, probable nuclear waste storage sites at Yongbyon. Plans to visit the sites in November had been suspended because the North never replied to the IAEA's request. At the meeting, North Korea provided no explicit guarantee the IAEA could visit the sites--and indeed cited the Team Spirit military exercise as a possible complication. Nevertheless, its delegate reiterated P'yongyang's commitment to fulfilling its safeguards obligations, thus backing away from earlier hints that P'yongyang might abrogate its agreement. In light of the North's more conciliatory statements [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] IAEA members decided not to escalate the issue and put off a request for a special inspection of the two sites. [REDACTED]

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


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
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

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


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**Looking Ahead: A North Korean Calendar**



Late January-  
March

US-South Korean military exercise Team  
Spirit (deployment and operational  
phases)



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


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




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


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
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


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